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ON PROFESSORS AND POOR PEOPLE-
A JURISPRUDENTIAL MEMOIR
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
But let the brother of low degree glory in his high estate: and the
rich, in that he is made low.-James 1:9-10
I am starting this paper after looking at the latest of a series of e-
mails regarding people who cannot scrape up the security deposits
required by the local gas company to turn their heat back on. They keep
shivering in the comers of their bedrooms or burning their houses down
with defective space heaters. The public agency that is supposed to
relieve the poor refuses to pay security deposits, and the private charities
that pay deposits are out of money. A bill that might improve matters
has passed one House of the Legislature, and is about to die in a
committee of the other House. I have a card on my desk from a former
student I ran into the other day. She works in the field of utility
regulation, and has promised to send me more e-mails on the subject. I
also have a pile of student papers on whether a lawyer can encourage a
client illegally in the country to marry her boyfriend in order not to be
deported.
What I am trying to do with all this material is exercise a
preferential option for the poor. I am working at it in a large,
comfortable chair in a large, comfortable office filled with large,
comfortable books, and a large-but not so comfortable-collection of
loose papers. At the end of the day, I will take some of the papers home
with me to my large, comfortable, and well heated house.
It is easy to wonder if I have opted for the poor in any meaningful
way when I am so far from being one of them. But, as I keep telling my
students as they head for the Wall Street law firms, the preferential
option for the poor is not a career choice. It is a matter of giving priority
to the interests of the poor in whatever situation you encounter. That is
what God calls all of us to do. Some people He calls to a life of
voluntary poverty. All honor to those who have that vocation and live
up to it, but voluntary poverty is not the condition of the poor. The poor
are people who have things happen to them that they do not want to have
* Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Legal Ethics, Notre Dame Law
School, Notre Dame, Indiana.
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happen. As I grow old and my body starts to creak, I begin to feel some
solidarity with such people, but that is hardly an option. My real
option-what I am really called to do--is to use my material and
intellectual resources, such as they are, for the benefit of poor people.
What it comes down to is that I am a law teacher, and my task is to
prefer the poor when I teach law, or, if you like, is to teach my students
how to prefer the poor. I propose in this paper to indicate how I have
learned-if I have learned-to do this. I call the paper a jurisprudential
memoir because the study of what laws ought to do and how to make
them do it is called Jurisprudence.
I. INTELLECTUAL FORMATION
I graduated from Harvard Law School in 1952. My teachers were
the last of the great scholars of the first half of the twentieth century who
founded a practical and realistic American jurisprudence with which
they hoped to save the world, or a good part of it. It was said in those
days that the way to Washington was to go to Harvard and turn left, and
most of us were not inclined to disagree.
The twin pillars of our legal thinking were Oliver Wendell
Holmes's American Legal Realism and Roscoe Pound's Sociological
Jurisprudence. The first told us what the law was, and the second told us
what it was for. Law, said Holmes, is "[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious.... ."' But we were
not only to predict what courts would do; we were to persuade them to
do what they should. Pound set before the whole enterprise "a great task
of social engineering,, 2 to make the limited resources of the world meet
as many human wants as possible with the least possible friction and
waste. Pound's technological metaphors dominated our aspirations, and
infected them with a pervasive hubris.
The growth of social legislation beginning in the late nineteenth
century, and culminating under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt
represented for us a new understanding of the proper way to put our
profession to work. Much of our study of Constitutional Law consisted
of deploring the mossback judges who used to strike these statutes
down, and praising their enlightened successors who let them stand. I
studied Labor Law under Archibald Cox, who was to become the
nemesis of Richard Nixon. I was one of the first generation of law
students to take a course in Administrative Law, the operation and
1. O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).
2. Roscoe Pound, Social Control through Law 64 (Yale U. Press 1942).
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control of government agencies. Two years later, when I was working
for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company administering compensation for
injured workers, I found myself in a roomful of the best insurance
lawyers in Massachusetts, convened in an emergency meeting to discuss
a proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State. I was the only
person in the room who had taken a course in Administrative Law, and
the only person (or so I thought) who had a clue as to what was going
on.
Those of us who were Catholic-not a lot-connected all this
beneficent legislation with something called Catholic Social Teaching,
to which we were exposed on a parochial level, and ultimately with
Natural Law, of which we got fleeting glimpses in Lon Fuller's
Jurisprudence course, and in undergraduate courses in Philosophy or
Theology. Part of the teaching involved the concept of social justice, the
virtue we practice by doing our best to reform the structures of society
so that they will render to people what is due them. A few older
scholars hinted that a number of these Catholic teachings had entered
into our social legislation through their influence on some of Roosevelt's
advisers.3
Two years out of law school, I left Liberty Mutual and started
teaching. One of my first assignments was Modem Social Legislation,
out of a casebook by that name.4 It dealt with the Elizabethan poor law
that was in force pretty much unchanged in many states, with other
forms of relief, with Social Security, with Workmen's (now called
Workers') Compensation, and with Wages and Hours Laws. It gave
firm support to the conviction that justice, not charity, was behind these
laws, and at least tacit support to the idea that these laws were doing
what needed to be done.
The actual poor were largely invisible in those days. I remember a
national magazine, Time, I think, saying that a charitable organization
that distributed Christmas turkeys to poor families could not find enough
poor families to dispose of all its turkeys. At least for me, and I believe
for many others, the poor were brought back into view by two people,
Bill Stringfellow and Michael Harrington. One I knew personally, the
other I knew from his book.
3. See George Q. Flynn, American Catholics & the Roosevelt Presidency: 1932-1936 (U.
Ky. Press 1968); David J. O'Brien, American Catholics and Social Reform: The New Deal Years
(Oxford U. Press 1968).
4. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Richard C. Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation (Found. Press
1950).
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In the summer of 1959, when I had been teaching for five years,
and at Notre Dame for three, I came upon an article in the Harvard Law
School Bulletin, Christianity, Poverty, and the Practice of the Law by
William Stringfellow, 1956.' He had come directly from law school to
East Harlem, then the most miserable part of New York City, "to live
there, to practice law there, to take some part in politics, to be a layman
in the Church."6 He described his milieu in terms that were soon to
become familiar, although I found them a revelation at the time:
Poverty is my very first client in East Harlem-a father whose
child died from being bitten by a rat .... Poverty is a widow on
welfare whose landlord cuts the heat knowing that the winter will
end before the complaint is processed. Poverty is an addict who
pawns the jacket off his back to get another "fix."... Poverty is
the payoff to a building inspector not to report violations of the
building code.... Poverty is the relentless daily attrition of
contending with the most primitive issues of human existence:
food, cleanliness, clothes, heat, housing, and rest. Poverty is an
awful vulnerability.
7
He had no answers to the problems he set forth in five pages of
careful description and analysis. He simply said that "[t]he awful
vulnerability of the poor is in fact the common vulnerability of every
man to death. And from the power of death no man may deliver his
brother... ," The Christian presence in the world of the poor is not
"some commitment to generous charity, nor fondness for 'moral and
spiritual values ....,9
It is, instead, the knowledge that there is no pain nor privation nor
humiliation nor disaster nor scourge nor distress nor destitution
nor hunger nor striving nor anxiety nor temptation nor wile nor
suffering nor frustration nor poverty which God had not known
and borne for all in Jesus Christ. He has borne death itself on
behalf of all, and in that event He had broken the power of death
once and for all.' 0
We brought Stringfellow out to talk to our students in the spring of
1960. He began by telling them that his main distinction was that he
was the lowest paid graduate of the Harvard Law School. He described
5. William Stringfellow, Christianity, Poverty, and the Practice of the Law, 8 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 451 (1979) (1st published in 10 Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 4 (1959).
6. Id. at 451.
7. Id. at 451-452.
8. Id. at457-458.
9. Id. at 458.
10. Id.
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for them the situation in East Harlem and the work that he did. Hand
after hand went up at the end of his talk, with students asking how these
problems could be solved. He said that the world does not solve its
problems; it only rearranges them. He was scornful of the social
workers that commuted in from Westchester with a view to making East
Harlem like Westchester. But he did not insist on all Christian lawyers
joining him in East Harlem. His concern was death, and death is
everywhere. What he said that most impressed me was that the role of a
Christian is to bring out the witness to Christ that is latent in every
situation.
Ultimately, I could not accept Stringfellow's insistence on total
alienation from the powers of this world." I kept believing that there is
a Christian way to exercise power, and that the role of a Christian lawyer
is to persuade those who exercise power to exercise it in that way. I had
started on a decades-long study of the legal development of the Church
of England as an attempt to retain the medieval church-state synthesis in
a pluralist world.' 2 I came up with an ecclesiology that accepted at least
the theoretical possibility of a public order conformable to God's will.
In 1979, I published an article entitled Pluralist Christendom and the
Christian Civil Magistrate.3 It appeared in the Capital University Law
Review with various other papers on theology and law, including a
republication of Stringfellow's piece from the 1959 Harvard Law School
Bulletin.' 4 But my encounter with Stringfellow had permanently raised
my consciousness regarding the condition of the poor. When I read
Michael Harrington's The Other America'5 in 1962, I learned a lot more
about poverty, but none of it came as a surprise to me.
I cannot remember when I first read The Communist Manifesto. It
was probably when I was in law school. At any rate, it has been part of
my intellectual furniture for most of my academic life. It is quite wrong
in many respects, but no one who has studied the nineteenth century can
fail to take it seriously. Where it went wrong was not in its description
11. See William Stringfellow, Christ and the Powers of Death, in A Keeper of the Word 192
(Bill Wylie Kellermann ed., Eerdmans 1994); Walter Wink, Stringfellow on the Powers, in
Radical Christian and Exemplary Lawyer 17 (Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., Eerdmans 1995);
Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., An Uneasy Relationship with the Law, in id. at 167.
12. See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Ecclesiastical Administration in Medieval England: The Anglo-
Saxons to the Reformation (U. Notre Dame Press 1977); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Lay Authority and
Reformation in the English Church: Edward I to the Civil War (U. Notre Dame Press 1982);
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law and Modernization in the Church of England: Charles II to the Welfare
State (U. Notre Dame Press 1991).
13. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 413 (1979).
14. Stringfellow, supra n. 5.
15. Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (MacMillan 1962).
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of its own time, but in its prediction of the future. It had become
obvious by my time that capitalism was not about to destroy itself as
Marx and Engels had predicted it would. Keynes had shown that
capitalists did not have to eat each other up in battles over markets
because they could create their own markets by not underpaying their
workers.
But I found the Marxist version of class dialectic persuasive. It
shed a good deal of light for me on the legal developments of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I never accepted the idea that
law must inevitably serve the interests of the ruling class, but I realized
more and more that that was what it would do unless we made it do
something better.
My picture of class dialectic was completed by two books, The
Organization Man by William H. Whyte, 16 published in 1956, and The
New Class by Milovan Djilas,"7 published in 1957. Djilas, a leading
Yugoslav Communist until he wrote this book, argued that the
assumption of power by the proletariat as Marx and Engels envisaged it
could not come to pass because the proletariat were not adequately
organized. Accordingly, a class of surrogates grew up to exercise power
on their behalf. With rigorous Marxist methodology, Djilas showed
how this class, more or less coextensive with the Communist Party, had
acquired power in the Soviet Union and in the Communist states of
Eastern Europe, and how they exercised their power when they had it.
Djilas believed that the bureaucracies of the capitalist states did not
constitute a class as the ruling Communist parties did. 8 There I parted
company with him. It seemed to me that the class I belonged to had
become powerful in about the same way the Eastern Communists had.
Corporate managers as surrogates for the suppliers of capital, labor
organizers as surrogates for workers, government officials as surrogates
for the general public, and lawyers as surrogates for everybody had more
in common with each other than with their respective constituencies.
Capital was no longer in control of industry: managers hired their capital
as they did their labor, and when they lost their capital, they proceeded
under the bankruptcy laws to get more. Whyte's book was a persuasive
description of the ethos of this class, and of the way they exercised
power. Putting the two books together, I came to the conclusion that
just as the transition from feudalism to capitalism came peacefully in
England while it required a revolution in France, so the transition from
16. William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (Simon & Schuster 1956).
17. Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (Prager 1957).
18. Id. at 42-44.
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capitalism to managerialism came peacefully in the West while it
required a revolution in Russia. This perception gave me useful insights
into a number of legal developments during the last half of the twentieth
century.
At this point, I had come a long way from Sociological
Jurisprudence. The renewed awareness of continuing poverty
undermined confidence in Pound's technological metaphors. If social
engineering is what lawyers do, they are not doing it very successfully.
At the same time, the class dialectic of Marx and Djilas indicates that
social change is being brought about by forces quite other than law.
I came upon Jacques Maritain's On the Philosophy of History1 9
shortly after it came out in 1957. Maritain presented a complex and
sophisticated philosophy, one of whose tenets was what he called the
law of the "ambivalence of history":
[A]t each moment human history offers to us two faces. One of
these faces gives grounds to the pessimist, who would like to
condemn this period of history. And the other gives grounds to the
optimist, who would like to see the same period as merely
glorious.20
The role of human endeavor-and therefore the role of law-in any
period, therefore, is to enhance the good and resist the evil that is
inevitably present in any historical situation.
This introduction to the philosophy of history provided a further
critique of Sociological Jurisprudence. Law, unlike other social forces,
is under human control. We have this or that law because people in
authority choose that we shall have it. In the last analysis, the project of
Sociological Jurisprudence is to use this power of choice to take control
of history. The thing cannot be done. We can have considerable
success in solving this or that problem, but the overall course of history
can be neither predicted nor controlled. As Herbert Butterfield put it in
The Whig Interpretation of History, l a book that made a profound
impression on me when I encountered it in my study of English church
history: "Perhaps the greatest of all the lessons of history is this
demonstration of the complexity of human change and the unpredictable
character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of
men . .. 22
19. Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History (Joseph W. Evans ed., Scribner 1957).
20. Id. at 52.
21. H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (Scribner 1951).
22. Id. at 21.
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So it would seem that the role of our profession in history is neither
to follow it and implement it as the Marxists say, nor to take control of it
as the project of Sociological Jurisprudence supposes. Rather, it is to
stand outside the process, making incremental infusions of justice as the
opportunity presents itself. This formulation has a certain affinity for
traditional natural law doctrine: that too envisages a stance outside
history, and values to be introduced into the process from without.
23
At this point in my thinking, I had to cope with Jacques Ellul's
radical undermining both of natural law and of any pursuit of justice by
the legal profession. Bill Stringfellow gave me Ellul's The Theological
Foundation of Law24 to read when it first came out in English in 1960,
and I did a review of it for the Natural Law Forum.2 ' Ellul argued that
natural law is a fact of creation that you have to take into account when
you make laws, just as you have to take the shape of the body into
account when you make clothes, but as all creation was corrupted by the
Fall, there is no basis for regarding natural law as either just or good.
The purpose of human law is not to implement natural law, and not to
support a good life, but simply to preserve the world for judgment:
Law is commissioned to make life possible for man and to
organize society in such a way that God may maintain it .... Just
as rights are granted to man for the sake of the covenant, the world
is preserved with a view to the coming judgment .... The world
is preserved in order that the Word may be proclaimed and that
salvation in Jesus Christ be announced.26
This doctrine precludes any attempt of law to be salvific, and
considerably discourages any attempt to be utilitarian, or even just:
The demonic temptation of law consists of a vision of society
without a purpose, or of a purpose other than the judgment of God,
realised hic et nunc in the preaching of the gospel. Again we must
point out that when law organizes society exclusively for the sake
of man's happiness, of production, of power and glory or of riches,
and not for the sake of the judgment, it ceases to preserve the
world.27
23. See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Books Reviewed, 3 Nat. L. Forum 210 (1958) (reviewing
Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History).
24. Jacques Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law (Marguerite Wieser trans., Doubleday
1960).
25. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Books Reviewed, 8 Nat. L. Forum 188 (1963) (reviewing Jacques
Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law).
26. Ellul, supra n. 24, at 103-104.
27. Id. at 104.
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Within his understanding of preserving man for the covenant and the
world for judgment, Ellul left room for only a modest aspiration to use
the law for what other people would see as social justice: "[T]he social,
economic, and political conditions of life, brought about by law, must
prevent man from being cornered by death."28
In 1975, I put together a sweeping critique of the Sociological
Jurisprudence of my youth in a little paper called Law, Social Change,
and the Ambivalence of History.29 I drew heavily on Maritain and
Butterfield. Reading the piece today, I see Ellul lurking in the
background. I do not mention him, but I seem to be groping for a way to
transcend the limited role he assigns to law without returning to the
discredited and hubristic metaphors of social engineering.
What I came up with was a project for replacing technological
metaphors with verbal ones:
When we make or invoke laws we are using words to make claims
on other people, and through people, on history. There are
manipulative elements of course, but fundamentally we are not
manipulating people, we are addressing them. We are not being
"engineers" or using "instruments," we are being spokesmen. 30
I managed to work this spokesmanship into a pretty high aspiration, but
not one that could be pursued with much confidence in the outcome: "To
demand justice passionately, resourcefully and against all odds is the
mark of humanity in its pilgrimage through time. 31 I ended up saying
that "[t]he lawyer should, after all, be content with the role of advocate,"
and that in the advocacy of social change, "though he is no stranger to
bizarre tribunals and equivocal results, he has the word of the Lord of
history that those who hunger and thirst after justice will be filled."32
It was not until 1979 that I read Gustavo Guti~rrez's A Theology of
Liberation.33 I had been working on other things, and had only
gradually become aware of the important place Liberation Theology was
beginning to occupy in Catholic social doctrine. But finally I went to a
colleague more current on such matters than I and asked him what book
on the subject I should read if I were to read only one. Naturally, he
gave me Guti~rrez.
28. Id. at 103.
29. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law, Social Change and the Ambivalence of History, in Philosophy
and Civil Law 164 (George F. McLean ed., Cath. U. Am. 1975).
30. Id. at 167.
31. Id. at 169.
32. Id. at 170.
33. Gustavo Guti~rrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (Caridad
Inda & John Eagleson eds. & trans., Orbis 1973).
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Gutirrez's teachings as I extracted them from his book were these:
People's response to God is blocked by unjust economic, social, and
political institutions, so that we owe it to our neighbors to rescue them
from these institutions by reforming or dismantling them. God calls us
to the work of doing so, and assures us of its value in building up His
Kingdom. Unjust institutions create a class struggle between victims,
who have a stake in reforming or dismantling them, and beneficiaries,
who have a stake in leaving them intact. Human solidarity is achieved
not by disregarding class struggle, but by siding with the victims. The
reform or dismantling of unjust institutions, in addition to liberating the
victims, liberates the beneficiaries from living on the flip side of other
people's misery.34
These doctrines filled gaps in my thought like missing pieces of a
jigsaw puzzle. The focus on liberation permits a purposeful deployment
of legal skills without buying into the tattered project of Sociological
Jurisprudence. Instead of trying to put together a globally effective
structure, we can work at reforming or demolishing institutions that we
have in front of us in order to remedy evils and injustices that we
observe. Because liberation is open-ended, we can pursue it with good
purpose despite Butterfield's warning that we cannot foresee all the
results of what we are doing. Liberation is just, and justice is to be done
although the skies fall. By the same token, because the work of
liberation is eschatologically validated, we do not have to worry about
validating it historically. The ambivalence that Maritain perceives is no
problem for us. And where Ellul assigns us the static function of
preserving the world for judgment, Gutirrrez allows us to work to bring
about God's Kingdom. Even though we cannot accomplish the work,
God values it, and will use it in some way:
Faith proclaims that the brotherhood which is sought through the
abolition of the exploitation of man by man is something possible,
that efforts to bring it about are not in vain, that God calls us to it
and assures us of its complete fulfillment, and that the definitive
reality is being built on what is transitory. Faith reveals to us the
deep meaning of the history which we fashion with our own
hands: it teaches us that every human act which is oriented toward
the construction of a more just society has value in terms of
communion with God.35
Gutirrrez's eschatological emphasis clarified for me a problem I
had begun to notice in traditional natural law doctrine-its failure to
34. Id. at 275-276.
35. Id. at 237-238.
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cope with tragedy. Our nature may teach us how we ought to behave,
and our laws may profitably implement the teaching, but the hard work
of our profession is done where the teachings are violated and we are
left with the pieces to pick up. Nature does not tell us about picking up
pieces, but theology does. And what it tells us is that, since the original
Fall, we all have pieces to pick up, and that God does not intend for us to
be put back together the way we were. He intends for us to be on our
way to a destiny which eye has not seen nor ear heard. That destiny is
compatible with our nature, but not defined by it. Our job, whether as
lawyers or simply as human beings, is not to deliver people to that
destiny, for we do not know how to do that, but to set them on their feet
and take the stumbling blocks out of their path.
Unlike Marx, Gutirrez relativizes class struggle. By doing so, and
by attributing class divisions to unjust institutions, he clarified for me
the role of law in the dialectical process. Anyone who studies legal
history enough will recognize that laws can often be adopted not
because they serve the interests of the ruling class, but because they are
deemed just whosever interests they serve. Reflecting on the same
history in the light of Gutirrrez's observations, I came to see that laws,
once adopted, can sometimes support the rise of new classes to take
advantage of those laws rather than maintaining the hegemony of classes
already in place. Even if they were enacted for the sake of justice, they
can become unjust through the new class structures to which laws give
rise, and thereby can give rise to a class of victims to set off against the
class of beneficiaries. Given these perceptions, I could see each
dominant class in its turn appropriating in support of its hegemony the
values behind the laws that had first empowered it-whether or not it
continued to implement those values. I attached to this phenomenon the
name false consciousness-a term which Marxists use in a somewhat
different way.
It was as a remedy for false consciousness that I adopted the
liberationists' "preferential option for the poor." The actual term did not
appear in Guti6rrez's book. In his Introduction to the revised edition, he
says that its first official use was by the Latin American bishops at
Puebla in 1979, although "it was a formula that theologians in Latin
America had already begun to use in preceding years. 36 It was used by
John Paul II in a number of places, including his major social encyclical
Centesimus Annus (1991).1 7 The American hierarchy used it in their
36. Gustavo Guti~rrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation xxvi
(Caridad Inda & John Eagleson eds. & trans., 2d rev. ed., Orbis 1988).
37. Pope John Paul 1I, On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum: Centesimus Annus
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1986 pastoral Economic Justice for All.38 I began using it in about 1985.
I equated it with the view that Charles Kingsley, in a novel I had read a
little earlier, Yeast (1851), puts into the mouth of his protagonist,
Lancelot Smith:
I think, honestly... that we gentlemen all run into the same
fallacy. We fancy ourselves the fixed and necessary element in
society, to which all others are to accommodate themselves.
"Given the rights of the few rich, to find the condition of the many
poor." It seems to me that other postulate is quite as fair: "Given
the rights of the many poor, to find the condition of the few
rich.
Putting together all these different influences, experiences, and
reflections, I have come up with what I have, perhaps too sanguinely,
labeled a Jurisprudence of Liberation.40 In what follows, I will set forth
the principles of that jurisprudence as briefly as I can, and try to show
how they point to the preferential option for the poor, and support its
exercise.
II. LIBERATION JURISPRUDENCE
The first principle is that individuals, communities, and humanity
as a whole are called to a journey, a pilgrimage, to a destiny that fulfills
human nature but transcends it in ways we do not understand. That
destiny is adumbrated in every historical situation-as the Second
Vatican Council puts it, the Kingdom of God is "already present in
mystery., 41 We can know the general direction of the journey. We can
discern and attempt to cope with obstacles and deviations. But we
cannot know the end well enough to adopt a definitive strategy for
reaching it. Institutions and systems committed to a known and
therefore spurious destiny are simply additional obstacles. For this
reason, liberation has a primary place among the objects of law. It
relates the enterprise to obstacles that can be observed and understood
rather than to goals that can be perceived only in mystery.
Our professional skills can therefore be deployed for purposes to
which they are adequate. We can deal with problems as they arise, and
57 (U.S. Cath. Conf. 1991).
38. Natl. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic
Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 52 (U.S. Cath. Conf 1986).
39. Charles Kingsley, Yeast 108 (Coop. Publication Socy. 1899).
40. My theory is set forth at greater length in Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pilgrim Law (U. Notre
Dame Press 1998).
41. Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World:
Gaudium et Spes 38 (Pauline Books & Media 1965).
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when, as often happens, our solutions give rise to new problems, we can
deal with them as well. When people fall by the wayside, we can pick
them up, dust them off, set them on their feet, and do the same thing
again if they fall again a few paces down the road. The historical
indeterminacy of the work is made up for by its eschatological fruition.
As Guti~rrez says, it has value in terms of communion with God.
When we serve our clients, we do not merely improve their
situation in the existing legal landscape; we change the landscape itself.
We propose statutes and regulations and sometimes get them enacted.
Our advocacy can bring about new developments in the judge-made law.
And our transactional lawyering can establish new ways to use the law
and show new changes that it requires. In all these works, our ultimate
commitment is to justice. As Sir William Blackstone, author of the
primary textbook in our legal system, put it when he embarked on the
study of his profession:
Then welcome business, welcome strife,
Welcome the cares, the thorns of life;
The visage wan, the pore-blind sight,
The toil by day, the lamp at night,
The tedious forms, the solemn prate,
The pert dispute, the dull debate,
The DROWSY BENCH, the babbling Hall,
For thee, fair JUSTICE, welcome all!
42
Our pursuit of justice involves the replacement of unjust laws and
institutions. It is a task that will not be completed this side of the
eschaton, because the forces of history and the creativity of evil are
constantly making just laws and institutions operate unjustly.
When new laws and institutions appear, new classes arise to take
advantage of them. The feudal landholding class came to power through
legal arrangements calculated to provide local administration and police
in countries with no effective infrastructure. The capitalist class came to
power through legal arrangements calculated to allow for more creative
use of resources as society became more settled and more prosperous.
The managerial class came to power through legal arrangements
calculated to distribute more fairly the wealth created by capitalists and
the people they hired to work for them.
Each of these classes, when its power has been consolidated, has
tended to take control of the legal system. While I do not believe a
ruling class makes laws merely to protect and perpetuate its own
hegemony, it does tend to overvalue its contribution to the common
42. David Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 193 (U. N.C. Press 1938).
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good, and that of the laws and institutions on which its power is
founded. It was common for feudal landholders to believe that only
their paternal benevolence kept the peasantry from anarchy and ruin, and
for capitalists to believe that only the free operation of the market could
provide enough goods and services to keep society from collapsing. It is
common for managers and professionals today to believe that the
interplay of economic, social, and technical forces is too complicated for
any but themselves to understand. And each class has tended naturally
to make and apply laws in accordance with its beliefs.
It is false consciousness that leads a whole society to believe that
the ruling class continues to implement the values that led to the
adoption of the laws on which its power is based, and that those values
continue to be the ones most in need of being implemented. For
Marxists, consciousness is false only when it leads other classes to
support the hegemony of the ruling class. Members of the ruling class
may have the same consciousness, but for them, it is not false. The
distinction between truth and falsehood, like everything else in the
Marxist system, is class-bound. But as Christians we believe in an
objective reality beyond class. Any consciousness that does not
conform to that reality is false for everybody.
The preferential option for the poor is the primary remedy for false
consciousness. It involves, as the name implies, preferring the interests
of the poor to those of other people involved in whatever project is
under consideration. It is a claim for the poor and an ascesis for the
ruling class. I call it an ascesis because I cannot see that strict justice
requires it. If it were possible to judge evenhandedly between rich and
poor, I should suppose strict justice would be satisfied. But it is
common Sunday school morality that if we set out to do no more than is
required of us, we will end up doing less. As a practical matter, we of
the ruling class can do justice to the poor only by preferring them.
III. LIVING WITH THE OPTION
If we are to succeed in implementing a preferential option for the
poor, there are a couple of points that we have to make clear at the
outset. First, as I tell my students, the preferential option for the poor is
not a career choice. I stress this point because I am a law teacher, and
my students have immediate choices before them. If they take what they
call "public interest" jobs-as prosecutors, public defenders, legal aid
lawyers, or counsel to government agencies-they will serve the poor a
good deal of the time, but the pay is so low that they believe they will
not be able to support their families and pay off their student loans. If
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they go with the major law firms that pay astronomical salaries, they
will be financially secure, but they will mostly serve the rich. I tell them
that the burdens of the poor are being fashioned in the major law firns
faster than they can be relieved by the public interest offices. One way
of opting for the poor, therefore, is to bring their claims to the attention
of one's corporate clients, who are often thoughtless rather than
malicious in the harm they do, or at least are willing to alleviate the
harm if it is not too expensive to do so.
Next, the preferential option for the poor is not a power base. The
poor, like the proletarians in Milovan Djilas's analysis, cannot take
power for themselves because they lack the organization and expertise
required to exercise power in a modem state. But there are many
politicians with the requisite credentials ready and willing to exercise
power on their behalf, or on behalf of this or that constituency among
them. Such politicians easily fall prey to false consciousness. Having
been elected to serve the poor, they keep believing that they are doing
so, whatever compromises they accept. Worse, having come to power
through the victimization of their constituents, they have a stake in that
victimization continuing, a stake which may unconsciously color their
attitude toward efforts to make things better. It is important for
politicians, like other members of the elite, to exercise a preferential
option for the poor, but those who serve poor constituencies do not
necessarily have a privileged way of doing so. We can serve the poor at
least as effectively by confronting and challenging power on their behalf
as by exercising it on their behalf.
In the end, it seems that the preferential option for the poor is not
so much a doctrine as a habit of heart and mind, a way of looking at
situations to which our doctrines may apply. Nor, it seems, is there a
discrete body of people who are always and everywhere the poor. The
poor are those who, in a particular situation, lack something that they
need for a fully human existence. It may be useful employment in one
place, education or health care in another. Or in a particular transaction,
the poor are those whose needs are left out of account. In a corporate
merger or a plant closing, the poor are the workers who will lose their
jobs. In a condominium conversion, the poor are the tenants who cannot
afford to buy the converted units. When a new medicine is put on the
market, the poor are the sick people who cannot afford to buy it. In the
War on Drugs, the poor are the Bolivian peasants who try to eke out a
modest living growing coca leaves, All these transactions involve
lawyers and, as lawyers committed to the preferential option for the
poor, we must look steadily at the poor people affected by them, and
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keep their concerns on the table as we deploy our advocacy and
negotiating skills in the affairs of our various clients.
My friend and colleague Tom Shaffer, preeminent among thinkers
and writers on the lawyer-client relation, has paid a good deal of
attention to the idea that the practicing lawyer is a retailer of justice.4 3
The metaphor comes from Arthur Train's fictional lawyer, Ephraim
Tutt.41 If it is a good one-and I think it is-then I suppose academic
lawyers such as myself, along with legislators and appellate judges, must
be wholesalers. Unlike practicing lawyers, we are responsible for the
coherence, integrity, and utility of the whole system as well as for the
outcome of individual cases and transactions.
That responsibility offers important additional opportunities for
false consciousness. It is easy to believe that we live (and prosper)
under a basically beneficent system, that the misfortunes of those who
(unlike ourselves) fail to prosper under it are either the result of their
own improvidence or the inevitable consequences of an imperfect world,
and that if we tinker more than incrementally with the system,
unimaginable disasters will ensue. The belief sometimes takes the form
of a global methodology--cost-benefit analysis--or of a jurisprudential
theory-Law and Economics. In other cases it simply fuels opposition
to a particular reform. If we free the slaves, they will all starve. If we
give women the vote, families will be destroyed. If we make employers
hire blacks, all their white workers will quit. If we pay workers a living
wage, we cannot compete with manufacturers based in Guatemala or
Thailand.
Against any manifestation of this argument, the preferential option
for the poor prevails by virtue of the maxim fiat justitia ruat coelum, let
justice be done though the skies fall. The maxim applies to social justice
as surely as to other forms of justice. And to achieve social justice, we
must prefer the poor. They are the ones who are not receiving their due
under the system as it stands. They cannot wait for us to weigh in an
exact balance the claims of the prosperous classes to go on prospering.
Our calling as Christians is to resist known evils even at an unknown
cost. We cannot know all the consequences of our actions, and some of
the consequences we may well regret. But a world in which we do what
we can about the poverty we encounter, and then do our best to cope
with the consequences as they arise, is a better world than one in which
we pusillanimously allow our neighbors to languish in a poverty that we
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could alleviate if we would.
It is our faith that our efforts will not ultimately be in vain. The
Second Vatican Council tells us:
[A]fter we have obeyed the Lord, and in His Spirit nurtured on
earth the values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and
indeed all the good fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find
them again, but freed of stain, burnished and transfigured, when
Christ hands over to the Father: "a kingdom eternal and universal,
a kingdom of truth and life, of holiness and grace, of justice, love
and peace." On this earth that Kingdom is already present in
mystery. When the Lord returns it will be brought into full
flower.
Jurisprudence cannot assure us of this consummation. Faith can.
45. Second Vatican Council, supra n. 41, at 38 (footnote omitted).
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